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NOTES
Bankruptcy: Pennsylvania Welfare Department v.
Davenport: The Supreme Court Officially Declares
Safe Passage for Criminal Offenders Via Chapter
13. Are Criminal Penalties Within the Scope of the
Bankruptcy Code?
Introduction
Should convicted criminals be allowed to avoid obligations imposed as
part of their criminal sentence, under the Bankruptcy Code (the Code)?1
Since the Code's 1978 enactment, this question has been increasingly
raised. 2 State criminal laws conflict with the federal bankruptcy laws when
a convicted criminal files a bankruptcy petition seeking a discharge of
debts which include a criminal restitution obligation.3 Traditionally, many
courts have avoided the conflict by holding that criminal restitution ob-
ligations are not "debts" under the Code and thus are not affected by
bankruptcy proceedings.
4
The United States Supreme Court recently abandoned this traditional
approach in Pennsylvania Welfare Department v. Davenport.5 In that case,
the Court, leaving no room for interpretation, held that criminal restitution
obligations are debts under the Code.6 As a result, the Court found such
obligations dischargeable under chapter 13 of the Code.
7
1. The Bankruptcy Code is codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
2. See infra note 4.
3. See general discussion about bankruptcy infra notes 12-36 and accompanying text.
4. For decisions holding that criminal restitution obligations are not "debts," see In re
Norman, 95 Bankr. 771, 774 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); In re Oslager, 46 Bankr 58, 61 (Bankr.
M.D. Pa. 1985); In re Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. 129 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984); In re George G.
Solar Co., 44 Bankr. 828, 830 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984); In re Vik, 45 Bankr. 64, 67 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa 1984); In re Cornell, 44 Bankr. 528, 530 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984); In re Mead,
41 Bankr. 838, 840 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984); In re Cox, 33 Bankr. 657, 662 (Bankr. M.D.
Ga. 1983); In re Johnson, 32 Bankr. 614, 616-17 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); In re Magnifico,
21 Bankr. 800, 803 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982); In re Button, 8 Bankr. 692, 694 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1981). But see In re Erickson, 104 Bankr. 364, 371 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); In
re Cancel, 85 Bankr. 677, 679 (N.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Cullens, 77 Bankr. 825, 828 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1987); In re Vendrovec, 61 Bankr. 191, 194-95 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986); In re Carrol,
61 Bankr. 178, 179 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986); In re Brown, 39 Bankr. 820, 821-26 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1984); In re Newton, 15 Bankr. 708, 709-10 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
5. 110 S. Ct. 2126 (1990).
6. Id. at 2134.
7. Id. There were some previous lower court decisions reaching this result. See, e.g.,
In re Heincy, 78 Bankr. 246, 249 (Bankr. 1987), rev'd, 858 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1988); In re
Cullens, 77 Bankr. 825, 827-28 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987). Congress recently amended the
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The Davenport decision was preceded by the Court's 1986 decision in
Kelly v. Robinson.' In Kelly, the Court held that criminal restitution
obligations are not dischargeable under chapter 7 of the Code. 9 The Court
declined to decide whether criminal penalties, including restitution obli-
gations, are debts because section 523(a)(7) excepts all criminal penalties
from discharge.10 However, the Court's opinion shows a heavy inclination
toward finding that criminal penalties were not intended by Congress to
constitute debts under the Code."
This note first gives a brief overview of bankruptcy law and of criminal
restitution obligations. It then analyzes the Kelly and Davenport cases and
discusses how they are both consistent and inconsistent at the same time.
In addition, this note reveals the problems created by the Supreme Court's
approach in each of these cases and suggests a different approach. Finally,
the note examines recently enacted legislation on the subject and proposes
an alternative amendment to the Code.
Overview of Bankruptcy and
Criminal Restitution Obligations
Bankruptcy
The Constitution specifically grants Congress the power to establish
national bankruptcy laws.' 2 The current bankruptcy law is contained in
the Bankruptcy Code of 1978.'1 Generally, the Code has two primary
Code making restitulior, obligations nondischargeable under chapter 13. See discussion infra
notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
8. 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
9. Id. at 53.
10. Id. at 50.
11. See infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power "to establish... uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States").
13. Initially, bankruptcy law was designed as a remedy for creditors to provide for the
equitable distribution of the debtor's assets to the creditors. See 1 COIER oNr BANKRUPTCY
J 1.02 (15th ed. 1985} [hereinafter CoLER]. Until 1978, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 governed
federal bankruptcy law. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1979); see S.
REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT], reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEws 5787, 5788. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 repealed the
former Act and sought to modernize and upgrade the existing bankruptcy laws. See SENATE
REPORT, supra, at 2-3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5788-89.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is the current statutory law relating to bankruptcy.
The law was embodied in Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)). It was substantially amended in 1984 by the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, and again in
1986 by the Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3124.
These various enactments have been codified in title 11 of the United States Code which
sets out the substantive law of bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy Code. SENATE REPORT, supra,




goals. One goal is to rehabilitate debtors14 by giving them a "fresh start."' 5
Bankruptcy gives debtors a "fresh start" by relieving their previous over-
whelming financial burdens.16 The Code's other primary goal is to distrib-
ute the property of an insolvent debtor fairly and equitably among the
debtor's various creditors.' 7 Thus, the bankruptcy laws serve the dual
purposes of protecting debtors and their creditors.
The filing of a petition in bankruptcy commences a bankruptcy case
and automatically constitutes an order for relief.' In addition, debt col-
lection attempts and proceedings against the debtor, with some excep-
tions, 9 are automatically stayed. 20 The stay protects the debtor from
harassment by creditors. 2' A chapter 7, or straight, bankruptcy is the most
common form of bankruptcy and contemplates the liquidation of the
debtor's property.22 In a chapter 7 case, a trustee is appointed 23 to collect
the non-exempt property of the debtor2 and convert it to cash.25 The cash
is then distributed by the bankruptcy court to the creditors. 26 All debts
are subsequently discharged unless expressly excepted by the Code.27 A
14. "Debtor" is a "person or municipality concerning which a case under [the Code]
has been commenced." I1 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1988). "Person" includes an individual,
partnership, and a corporation. Id. § 101(35).
15. See In re Vickers, 577 F.2d 683, 686-87 (10th Cir. 1978) (primary purpose of
bankruptcy is the rehabilitation of the debtor through relief of debt); Perez v. Campbell,
402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971) (primary purpose of bankruptcy laws is to allow debtors the
opportunity to be unhampered by their preexisting debts); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (bankruptcy gives a "new opportunity in life ... unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.").
16. Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 244; see also Perez, 402 U.S. at 648 (quoting Local Loan
Co., 292 U.S. at 244); In re Vickers, 577 F.2d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1978); In re Moynagh,
560 F.2d 1028, 1030 (1st Cir. 1977); In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999, 1003 (2d Cir. 1976); In
re Norman, 25 Bankr. 545, 547 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982); In re Hoover, 14 Bankr. 592, 596
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd, 38 Bankr. 325 (N.D. Ohio 1983); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 117 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT], reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONO. &
ADmN. NEws 5963, 6078, 6089.
17. D. STANLEY & M. GiRTH, BANKtPTcY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 9-10 (1971).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). An involuntary case may be commenced by a requisite
number of creditors with a requisite amount of claims under chapters 7 and 11 only; however
such filing of an involuntary petition does not automatically give rise to an order for relief.
Id. § 303.
19. Id. § 362(b).
20. Id. § 362(a). Section 362(b) lists proceedings against the debtor which are not stayed
as a result of filing the petition. Important examples are criminal proceedings, id. § 362(b)(1),
and collection of alimony, niaintenance or support, id. § 362(b)(2).
21. Id. § 362(a)(6).
22. Id. §§ 701-766.
23. Id. § 701(a)(l) provides for the appointment of an interim trustee by the United
States Trustee promptly after the order for relief (commencement of case in voluntary
proceeding). A different trustee may be elected by the creditors, but if the creditors fail to
do so then the interim trustee becomes the trustee of the case. Id. § 702.
24. Id. § 704(1).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 726. Section 726 also provides the order of distribution of the different types
of claims. Id.
27. In chapter 7 cases, discharge is governed by id. § 727. Subsection (b) of that section
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discharge shields the debtor from any judgment of personal liability and
from further debt collection activities with respect to the discharged debt.
2
1
Chapters 11, :[2 and 13 are concerned with the debtor's rehabilitation
as opposed to liquidation.29 This note focuses on chapter 13. A chapter
13 proceeding is voluntary ° and serves as an alternative to a chapter 7
liquidation by offering debtors an opportunity to work out their financial
problems under a rehabilitative plan.3' The plan provides a flexible way
for the debtor to repay his debts. 32 Unlike a chapter 7 debtor, the chapter
13 debtor retains possession of his property except as provided by the plan
or required by the court's confirmation order.33
Chapter 13 is avilable to any individual with regular income, regardless
of its source.34 Upon completion of the required payments, the debtor is
provides: "Except as provided in section 523 ... a discharge under subsection (a) of this
section discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before the date of the order for relief
under this chapter . . ." Id. § 727(b).
In chapter 13 cases, discharge is governed by § 1328 which provides:
As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under
the plan . . . the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided
for by the plan ... except any debt - (1) provided for under section 1322(b)(5)
of this title; or (2) of the kind specified in section 523(a)(5) of this title.
Id. § 1328(a). The court can, if certain conditions are met, grant a hardship discharge even
though payments are not completed under the plan. Id. § 1328(b). However, the scope of
a hardship discharge is the same as that under chapter 7 in that all of the exceptions to
discharge contained in § 523 apply. Id.
28. Id. § 524(a). That section provides:
A discharge in a case under this title - (1) voids any judgment at any time
obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal
liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged . . . (2) operates as
an injunction agadnst the commencement or continuation of an action, the
employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt
as a personal liability of the debtor ... and (3) operates as an injunction
against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of
process, or an act, to collect or recover from, or offset against, property of
the debtor ... that is acquired after the commencement of the case...
Id.
29. Chapter 11 is available to all debtors (e.g., individuals, partnerships, and corpora-
tions), id. § 109(d), and is codified at id. §§ 1101-1174. Chapter 12 is available only to
family farmers with regular annual income (id. § 109(f)), and is codified at id. §§ 1201-
1231. For chapter 13 information, see infra note 34 and accompanying text.
30. Id. §§ 303(a), 705(c), 1112(d).
31. The requirements a debtor's chapter 13 plan must satisfy are set out in id. § 1322.
Chapter 13 allows a debtor to retain his property, to retain better credit standing than under
chapter 7, and to avoid the stigma that attaches under a chapter 7 bankruptcy. HousE
REPORT, supra note 16, at 118, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963,
6079.
32. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 13, at 141, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONo. &
AMAN. NEws 5787, 5927. The plan does not have to provide for full payment of all
unsecured claims. See infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 1306 (1988).
34. Id. § 109(e). Additional requirements are that the debtor, on the date of the filing
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss2/6
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discharged from the debts which are provided for by the plan. 3 The
debtor's effort in completing the plan does not go unrewarded. The chapter
13 discharge is broader than a chapter 7 discharge, as only one of the
exceptions to discharge contained in section 523(a) is applicable.
6
Criminal Restitution Obligations
State criminal courts, at their discretion,37 may grant probation to
criminal offenders in lieu of, or in addition to, other criminal penalties.
38
A sentence of probation is designed to allow a criminal offender to
rehabilitate himself without incarceration. 39 The typical restitution order
is rendered as a condition of probation. 4° Such an order requires a criminal
of the petition, has unsecured debts of less than $100,000 and secured debts of less than
$350,000. Id.
35. Id. § 1328(a) states: "As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all
payments under the plan ... the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts
provided for by the plan" except debts under § 1322 (b)(5) (default debts) and § 523(a)(5)
(spouse and child support payments).
36. Id. § 1328(a). The only exception to discharge contained in § 523 applicable to a
chapter 13 normal discharge is the exception for alimony to, maintenance of, or support of
a spouse, former spouse or child contained in § 523(a)(5). However, all of the exceptions
are applicable in the case of a chapter 13 hardship discharge which may be granted to a
debtor who has not completed his plan if certain conditions are met. See id. § 1328(b).
Whereas under chapter 7, all ten of the exceptions to discharge contained in § 523 are
applicable which, including § 523(a)(5) debts, consist of debts: for certain taxes or customs
duties; for property, services or credit obtained under false pretenses or fraud; for unsched-
uled debts; for fraud by the debtor while acting as a fiduciary, embezzlement or larceny;
resulting from willful and malicious injury by the debtor; for fines, penalties, or forfeitures
to and for the benefit of a governmental unit; for educational loans issued or guaranteed
by a governmental unit; arising from liability which was incurred by the debtor as a result
of the operation of a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated; and which could have been
dealt with in a prior bankruptcy case in which the debtor waived or was denied a discharge.
Id. § 523(a).
37. Although probation is sometimes precluded by statute, the trial judge usually has
authority to place the defendant on probation or to impose a prison sentence, at the judge's
discretion. R. DAwsON, SENTENCING - T' E DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS
or SENTENCE 4 (1969). See also Best & Birzon, Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, 51
GEO. L.J. 809, 811-12 (1963).
38. See Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the Role of
the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. Rv. 52, 64-77 (1982); see also Best & Birzon, supra
note 37, at 811-12.
39. Harland, supra note 38; Best & Birzon, supra note 37. In Roberts v. United States,
320 U.S. 264 (1943), the Supreme Court stated that probation provides "an individualized
program offering a young or unhardened offender an opportunity to rehabilitate himself
without institutional confinement ... under the continuing power of the court to impose
institutional punishment." Id. at 272.
40. Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 HAxv.
L. REv. 931, 933 (1984). Restitution can, however, be made at any time during criminal
proceedings. Id. Government-sanctioned settlements between offender and victim may make
formal charges unnecessary, and defendants may avoid charges after indictment by agreeing
to make restitution. Id. See also Harland, supra note 38, at 64-77.
Probation statutes traditionally permit judges to impose conditions on probation at their
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
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offender to pay money in order to compensate for the loss he has caused. 4'
Although a victim of a crime will usually receive compensation, criminal
restitution is a criminal sanction. 42 The restitution order is one of the
alternatives available to the states' criminal justice systems in furthering
the goals of deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation.
4
1
Criminal restitution clearly serves as an individual deterrent to the
criminal offender because'he alone is required to bear the financial hard-
ship of making monetary payments. Restitution also operates as a stronger
deterrent than straight probation to others who might commit similar
crimes. 45 Restitution gives state criminal courts alternatives in fashioning
sentences intended to have deterrent effects, without resorting to incarcer-
ation.
Furthermore, restitution effectively serves the purpose of retribution.
The sanction is constructed to fit the crime, thereby emphasizing the
wrongfulness of the offense and the moral responsibility of the criminal
defendant. Restitution forces the offender to literally "pay" for his crime. 46
In addition, restitution forces the offender to recognize the consequences
of his crime and thus serves as an effective rehabilitative mechanism.
47
discretion. See, e.g., 22 OicLA. STAT. § 991a (Supp. 1986). The Oklahoma statute is extremely
broad, giving the court nearly complete discretion in determining probation conditions. The
court may suspend a sentence in whole or in part and may order restitution, reimbursement,
or community service. Id. It may also levy a fine or order confinement. Id.
41. Restitution is ordered in a variety of ways by requiring an offender to pay money
directly to the victim, to participate in a work program in which part of his salary is paid
to the victim, to render services to the victim, or community service in lieu of repayment
to the victim. Note, ,;upra note 40, at 933.
42. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52 (1986). The Court stated that although restitution
does resemble a judgment
"for the benefit of" the victim, the context in which it is imposed undermines
that conclusion. The victim has no control over the amount of restitution
awarded or over the decision to award restitution. Moreover, the decision to
impose restitution generally does not turn on the victim's injury, but on the
penal goals of the State and the situation of the defendant .... Because criminal
proceedings focus on the State's interests in rehabilitation and punishment,
rather than the victims desire for compensation, we conclude that restitution
orders imposed in such proceedings operate "for the benefit of" the State.
Id. at 52-53. See also Note, supra note 40, at 937-41.
To avoid any confusion due to the multitude of varying penalties possibly existing in
different contexts, for purposes of this note, "criminal restitution" refers to a restitution
obligation imposed upor a person as a result of the commission of a criminal offense by
that person.
43. See O.W. HoLtuss, THE COmMON LAW 41-51 (1881), reprinted in GOLDSTEIN &
GOLDSTEIN, CRnam, LAW, AND SocIETY 27-34 (1971); Note, supra note 40, at 946.
44. For a discussion of "individual" and "general" deterrence, see BuRNS & MArrINA,
SENTENCINO 1 (1978).
45. This is "general" deterrence. See id.
46. See Note, supra note 40, at 939.
47. Id. See also State v. Bausch, 83 N.J. 425, 434, 416 A.2d 833, 838 (1980) ("Restitution
related to the character or nature of the criminal offense of which defendant has been
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss2/6
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In Kelly v. Robinson,49 the debtor pleaded guilty to a charge of larceny
resulting from the wrongful receipt of welfare benefits. The debtor was
given a suspended prison sentence and placed on probation for five years.
As a condition of the probation, the state court ordered the debtor to
make restitution to the state in the form of monthly cash payments.
Shortly after the probation period began, the debtor filed a voluntary
petition under chapter 7 of the Code,50 listing the restitution obligation as
a debt. The debtor was granted a discharge from her debts pursuant to
section 727(a) of the Code. 51 Subsequently, the debtor was informed that
the state probation office considered the restitution obligation nondis-
chargeable. As a result, the debtor filed an adversary proceeding in the
bankruptcy court, seeking a declaration that the obligation had been
discharged.5 2
History of the Case
The bankruptcy court held that the debtor's discharge had not altered
the conditions of her probation.53 The court adopted the reasoning of In
re Pellegrino,5 4 which held that a restitution obligation is not a debt under
the Code because neither the victim nor the probation office has a right
to payment. 55
In Pellegrino, the court recognized the Code's broad definition of debt,1
6
but found an exception to the statutory definition in "the long-standing
tradition of restraint by federal courts from interference with traditional
functions of state governments. ' 5 7 The court also concluded that even if
convicted serves to instill a sense of responsibility for and an awareness of damage resulting
from wrongful conduct.").
48. See Note, supra note 40, at 939.
49. 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
50. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988).
51. Id. § 727. Section 727(a) provides that the bankruptcy court shall grant the debtor
a discharge unless certain limitations apply. See id. § 727(a)(1)-(10). Section 727(b) defines
the scope of a discharge providing that "a discharge under subsection (a) of this section
discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before the date of the order for relief under
this chapter . . ." Id. § 727(b).
52. In re Robinson, 45 Bankr. 423 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984), rev'd, 776 F.2d 30 (2d Cir.
1985), rev'd sub nom. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
53. Id. at 424.
54. 42 Bankr. 129 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984).
55. Id. at 132.
56. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1988) defines "debt" as "liability on a claim.
57. Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. at 134 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)); see also
In re Davis, 691 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1982).
1991]
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restitution obligations are debts subject to bankruptcy jurisdiction, they
are nondischargeable under section 523(a)(7) of the Code.
58
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected this view. 9 While
recognizing that most courts had reached the opposite conclusion,6° the
court held that a restitution obligation imposed as a condition of probation
is a debt. 6' The court then held that the obligation did not fall under the
section 523(a)(7) exception to discharge because the probation condition
was compensation for actual pecuniary loss. 62
Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court began its analysis of whether a res-
titution obligation is dischargeable by examining the language of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the Act). 63 The Court noted that the natural
construction of the Act's language would have allowed criminal penalties
to be discharged in bankruptcy. 4 However, it observed that courts had
not interpreted the Act in that manner. 6 The Court found that the widely
accepted view at the time Congress enacted the Code was that criminal
penalties, including restitution orders, were subject to a judicial exception
to discharge. 66 The Court noted the normal rule of statutory construction
that when Congress intends to change an established judicial concept, it
makes that intent specific. 67 Accordingly, the Court found that the Code
could not justifiably be interpreted as contrary to the view that criminal
penalties are excepted from discharge. 68
Emphasizing the fundamental policy against federal intrusion upon state
criminal prosecutions, 69 the Court refused to adopt an interpretation that
could lead to federal abatement of state criminal judgments.7 0 Such a result
would impede the flexibility of state criminal judges in choosing the
58. Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. at 135. Section 523(a)(7) provides that a discharge does not
affect any debt that "is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of
a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss." 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(7) (1988).
59. In re Robinson, 776 F,2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985), rev'd sub. nom. Kelly v. Robinson, 479
U.S. 36 (1986).
60. See supra note 4.
61. Robinson, 776 F.2d at 38.
62. Id. at 40. For the text of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1988), see supra note 57.
63. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 840 (repealed 1979).
64. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1986).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 45-46 (citing In re Moore, 111 F. 145, 148-49 (W.D. Ky. 1901) (judgments by
state or federal court imposing a fine in the enforcement of criminal laws are not affected
by bankruptcy proceedings); People v. Mosesson, 78 Misc. 2d 217, 218, 356 N.Y.S.2d 483,
484 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (a discharge in bankruptcy has no effect whatsoever upon a
condition of restitution of a criminal sentence.)).
67. Id. at 47 (quoting Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904)); see also Midlantic
Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986).
68. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 53.
69. Id. at 47 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971)).




combination of imprisonment, fines, and restitution most likely to further
the goals of state criminal justice systems.71 The Court stated that it did
not think Congress would lightly limit the options available to state
criminal judges. 72
The question of whether criminal penalties constitute debts under the
Code was then addressed. In regard to the question, the Court stated:
"[W]e have serious doubts whether Congress intended to make criminal
penalties 'debts' within the meaning of § 101(4)." 73 However, the Court
declined to decide the question because it held that section 523(a)(7)
protects from discharge any condition imposed by a state criminal court
as part of a criminal sentence.74 The Court found that section 523(a)(7)
creates a broad exception for all criminal sanctions, whether labeled as
fines, penalties, or forfeitures. 7"
Turning to the qualifying phrases in section 523(a)(7) which state that
fines must be "to and for the benefit of a governmental unit" and cannot
be "compensation for actual pecuniary loss," the Court held that because
criminal proceedings focus on the states' interests in punishment and
rehabilitation, rather than on a desire for compensation to the victim,
restitution orders operate for the benefit of the state and not as compen-
sation for the victim. 76 Therefore, the Court ruled that restitution orders
are within the meaning of section 523(a)(7) and thus are nondischargeable
under chapter 7.77
Pennsylvania Welfare Department v. Davenport
Factual Background
In Davenport, a married couple was convicted of welfare fraud in a
Pennsylvania state court. The court sentenced the couple to one year of
probation with the condition that the couple make monthly restitution
payments. The factual similarity of this case to Kelly is immediately
apparent.
The difference between Davenport and Kelly is that in Davenport, the
couple filed a petition under chapter 13 of the Code, instead of chapter
7, listing the restitution obligation as an unsecured debt. When the couple
71. Id. at 49.
72. Id. The Court stated: "If Congress had intended, by § 523(a)(7) or by any other
provision, to discharge state criminal sentences, 'we can be certain that there would have
been hearings, testimony, and debate concerning consequences so wasteful, so inimical to
purposes previously deemed important, and so likely to arouse public outrage."' Id. at 51
(quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 209 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
73. Id. at 50. "Debt" is defined at § 101(11) as "liability on a claim." 11 U.S.C. §
101(11) (1988). "Claim" is defined at § 101(4) as "right to payment, whether or not such
right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-
tured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured . . . ." Id. § 101(4).
74. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 50.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 53.
77. Id.
1991]
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failed to make the required payments, the probation department com-
menced probation violation proceedings. The couple notified the depart-
ment of the pending bankruptcy case and requested withdrawal of the
probation violation charges. When the department refused, the couple
sought a declaration by the bankruptcy court that the restitution obligation
was, in fact, dischargeable. While this action was pending, the couple's
chapter 13 plan was confirmed without objection.
History of the Case
The bankruptcy court ruled that the couple's restitution obligation was
an unsecured debt, which was dischargeable under section 1328(a) of the
Code.7 8 On appeal, the district court reversed, holding that state-imposed
criminal restitution obligations could not be discharged under chapter 13. 71
The court relied heavily on the Kelly dicta expressing serious doubts as to
whether Congress intended criminal penalties to be considered debts under
the Code.80 The district court also emphasized concerns about the intrusion
on the state criminal justice system by the federal courts.8' The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision, con-
cluding that restitution obligations are debts within the meaning of the
Code and are dischargeable under chapter 13.82
Supreme Court Decision
In light of Kelly's heavy condemnation of federal interference with the
state criminal justice system and its "serious doubts" as to whether
criminal penalties even constitute debts, presumably the Supreme Court
would require convicted debtors to fulfill their criminal obligations. How-
ever, the Court held that restitution obligations in a criminal case do
constitute debts within the meaning of the Code and are therefore dis-
chargeable under chapter 13.3
The Court began by taking note of Congress' broad view of the defi-
nition of a claim which gives rise to a debt. 84 The Court held that restitution
obligations fall within the term "claim" as defined under the Code.s A
78. Davenport v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 83 Bankr. 309, 316 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa.), rev'd, 89 Bankr. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1988), rev'd sub nom. In re Johnson-Allen, 871 F.2d
421 (3rd Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom., Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 110
S. Ct. 2126 (1990).
79. Davenport v. Pcnnsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 89 Bankr. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1988),
rev'd sub nom. In re Johnson-Allen, 871 F.2d 421 (3rd Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom.,
Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. 2126 (1990).
80. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
81. Davenport v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 89 Bankr. 428, 430 (E.D. Pa.
1988).
82. In re Johnson-Allen, 871 F.2d 421, 428 (3d Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Pennsylvania
Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. 2126 (1990).
83. Pennsylvania Welfare Dep't v. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. 2126, 2134 (1990). Chapter 13
is codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988).
84. For definitions of "debt" and "claim," see supra note 73.
85. See Davenport, 110 S. Ct. at 2132.
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claim is a "right to payment," 6 which is no more than an enforceable
obligation, irrespective of the state's objective in imposing the obligation.
87
The Court also rejected contentions that the automatic stay provision,
section 362(b)(1), reflects Congress' intent to exempt restitution orders
from discharge under chapter 13.88 Section 362(b)(1) exempts from the
stay "the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceed-
ing against the debtor."8' 9 The Court noted that the provision does not
explicitly exempt governmental efforts to collect restitution obligations
from a debtor. Therefore, the Court found that it was not irrational or
inconsistent policy to permit the prosecution of criminal offenses while
precluding probation officials from enforcing restitution orders during a
chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. 90
Also rejected by the Court was an argument relating to section 726.
That section establishes the order of distribution for chapter 7 claims. 9'
Subsection 726(a)(4) assigns a low rank to "any allowed claim, whether
secured or unsecured, for any fine, penalty, or forfeiture .. ".."92 The
United States, appearing amicus curiae, argued that the phrase "fine,
penalty, or forfeiture" should be construed as applying only to civil fines,
penalties and forfeitures. Otherwise, state and federal governments would
receive disfavored treatment relative to other creditors in both chapters 7
and 13. 91 In response to this argument, the Court held that section 726(a)(4)
does apply to criminal restitution obligations. 94 The Court held that the
phrase "fine, penalty, or forfeiture" must be given the same meaning in
section 726(a)(4) as in section 523(a)(7), which under Kelly includes criminal
restitution obligations. 9
The Court next addressed the Kelly dicta which suggested that restitution
obligations are not debts. 96 Although not expressly, the Court rejected the
dicta and held that given Kelly's decision that restitution obligations are
excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(7), debt could not be defined
narrowly so as to exclude criminal restitution orders. 97 The Court refused
86. 11 U.5'.C. § 101(4)(A) (1988).
87. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. at 2131.
88. Id. at 2133.
89. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (1988).
90. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. at 2132.
91. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1988).
92. Id. § 726(a)(4).
93. Section 1325(a)(4) provides that the court shall confirm a plan if "the value . .. of
property to be distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is
not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were
liquidated under chapter 7 .... " Id. § 1325(a).
94. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. at 2132-33.
95. Id. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(7), 726(a)(4) (1988).
96. See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
97. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. at 2133. The Court specifically stated: "Given Kelly's inter-
pretation of § 523(a)(7), . . . it would be anomalous to construe 'debt' narrowly so as to
exclude criminal restitution orders. Such a narrow construction of 'debt' necessarily renders
§ 523(a)(7)'s codification of the judicial exception for criminal restitution orders mere
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to interpret a statutory provision in a way that would render another
provision in the same enactment "superfluous. g"98
As a result, the Court held that criminal restitution obligations are
dischargeable under chapter 13 because section 523(a)(7) is not applicable
to a chapter 13 discharge.9 The Court denied that its refusal to create a
broad judicial exception to discharge for criminal restitution orders con-
stituted a retreat from the principles applied in Kelly.10" It noted the
statements in Keliy that if restitution obligations were permitted to be
discharged, state court judges would be hampered in fashioning appro-
priate sentences, anid state prosecutors would have to participate in federal
bankruptcy proceedings.' 0 In addition, the Court recognized that the
legitimate state interest in avoiding such intrusion is not diminished when
the offender files under chapter 13 rather than chapter 7.102 Nonetheless,
with those ideas in mind, the Court held that federal intrusion in this
context was the clear intent of Congress, and that the statute must be
enforced according to its terms. 03
Analysis
Restitution Obligations as Debts -. The Smaller Question
Together, Kelly and Davenport expose the entire issue of whether crim-
inal restitution obligations should be dischargeable in bankruptcy. While
the ultimate holdings of the two decisions are consistent, their reasoning
is not. In both cases, the Court focuses on the question of whether criminal
restitution obligations constitute debts under the Code. Under the Code,
debt is defined as a "liability on a claim,"'14 and claim is defined as a
"right to payment."1l0s The terms are co-extensive in that the creditor has
a claim against the debtor, who owes a debt to the creditor.' °6 In Dav-
enport, the Court, relying on the premise that Congress intended a broad
surplusage." Id. Congress has recently overruled this result making criminal restitution
obligations nondischargeable under chapter 13. See discussion infra notes 193-95 and accom-
panying text.
98. Id. (citing Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988)).
99. Title 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) provides:
As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under
the plan ... the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided
for by the plan . . . except any debt - (1) provided for under section 1322(b)(5)
of this title; or (2) of the kind specified in section 523(a)(5) of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1988). Congress recently amended section 1328(a) to make restitution
obligations nondischargeable under chapter 13. See discussion infra notes 193-95 and accom-
panying text.
100. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. at 2133.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2133-34.
104. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1988).
105. Id. § 101(4), which provides, in relevant part: ."claim' means ... right to pay-
ment ..... " Id.




definition, had no problem finding that restitution obligations are claims
giving rise to debts.' °7 The Court held that the phrase "right to payment,"
in the definition of claim, simply meant an enforceable obligation, re-
gardless of the objectives behind its imposition.108
In contrast, Kelly expressed "serious doubts" as to whether Congress
intended criminal penalties to fall under the definition of debt.' °9 However,
the Court declined to decide the question and held that section 523(a)(7)
preserved from discharge any condition imposed by a state criminal court
as part of a criminal sentence." l0
Through its efforts to avoid deciding whether criminal penalties are
debts, the Kelly Court unintentionally decided the question by holding
that section 523(a)(7) applied to such penalties. Relying on that holding,
the Davenport Court held that criminal penalties are debts under the
Code."' In Davenport, the Court reasoned that if Congress believed
restitution obligations were not debts, it would have no reason to except
such obligations from discharge in section 523(a)(7)."
2
The problem with this facile application of Kelly is that it glosses over
the underlying reasoning of the decision. In Kelly, the Court recognized
the Code's broad definition of debt, but found that the legislative history
of the Code does not compel the conclusion that Congress intended to
change the "state of the law" regarding criminal judgments."' The state
of the law referred to in Kelly was a well-established judicial exception to
discharge for all criminal sentences, despite the lack of such an exception
in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.14
107. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. at 2130. By defining "debt" and "claim" broadly, Congress
abandoned the "provability" concept of claims present under the old Act so that the
bankruptcy proceeding could deal with all potential financial obligations of the debtor and
preserve the "fresh start" goal of the bankruptcy laws. See HousE REPORT, supra note 16,
at 309, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONo. & ADhuN. NEws 5963, 6266.
108. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. at 2131.
109. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 50 (1986).
110. Id.
111. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. at 2132-33.
112. Id.
113. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 50 n.12. The Court cited the normal rule of statutory construction
that when Congress intends to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it
makes its intent specific. Id. at 47 (quoting Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of
Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986) (quoting in turn Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S.
441, 444 (1904))). See also supra note 72.
114. See In re Moore, 111 F. 145, 148-49 (W.D. Ky. 1901) (Bankruptcy Act "ha[s]
reference alone to civil liabilities, as demands between debtor and creditors," and not to
punishments for crimes); Zwick v. Freeman, 373 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1967) (citing Moore
and holding that "governmental sanctions are not regarded as debts even when they require
monetary payments"), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835 (1967); Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d
66, 71 (1st Cir. 1946) (adopted Moore's reasoning, holding it was not the intent of Congress
that bankruptcy laws "pardon a bankrupt from the consequences of a criminal offense");
In re Abramson, 210 F. 878, 880 (2d Cir. 1914) ("bankrupts who have violated laws passed
for the public good cannot escape punishment by going into bankruptcy").
See also People v. Washburn, 97 Cal. App. 3d 621, 625-26, 158 Cal. Rptr. 822, 825
(1979); People v. Mosesson, 78 Misc. 2d 217, 218, 356 N.Y.S.2d 483, 484 (Sup. Ct. 1974)
("A discharge in bankruptcy has no effect whatsoever upon a condition of restitution of a
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Kelly clearly suggests that the definition of debt does not include state
criminal penalties. The Court seemed primed to adopt such a definition,
but avoided the decision by falling back on the exception to discharge
contained in section 523(a)(7). 115
In Davenport, the Court decided the question by flatly holding that
criminal penalties are debts, contrary to the Kelly dicta suggesting other-
wise. 1 6 While Davenport is technically consistent with Kelly's holding that
section 523(a)(7) applies to criminal restitution obligations, it ignores the
reality that Kelly simply used section 523(a)(7) to avoid the question of
whether criminal penalties are "debts" under the Code.
As a result of the Davenport decision, convicted criminal offenders
could cleanse themselves of a criminal restitution obligation, in bankruptcy.
They merely had to file under chapter 13 instead of chapter 7. In a chapter
13 case, the debtor must prepare a plan, 17 which will have to meet certain
requirements."" The offender's chapter 13 plan may provide for less than
full payment of unsecured claims." 9 To be confirmed, the plan must only
be approved by the court.120 Creditors do not vote on the plan.'2' The
court will approve a plan if proposed in good faith and if unsecured
creditors are to receive at least as much under the plan as they would in
chapter 7.122
If less than the full amount of all claims is provided for by the plan,
the debtor must commit all of his disposable income for three years to
payments under the plan.2 3 Even so, the debtor is able to avoid a sub-
criminal sentence."); People v. Topping Bros., 79 Misc. 2d 260, 262, 359 N.Y.S.2d 985,
987-88 (Crim. Ct. 1974.). See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1979).
115. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1988). That section creates an exception to discharge "to the
extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a
governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss . . ." Id.
116. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. at 2131.
117. 11 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988).
118. Id. § 1322. Section 1322(a) requires that a plan must "(I) provide for the submission
of all or such portion of . . . future income ... to the . . . trustee as is necessary for the
execution of the plan; (2) provide for the full payment ... of all claims entitled to priority
under section 507 . . ; (3) ... provide for the same treatment for each claim within a
particular class." IdI.
119. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a)(6), 1325(a)(4) (1988).
120. Id. § 1325.
121. Id.
122. Section 1325(a) provides:
[The court shall confirm a plan if-(1) the plan complies with the provisions
... of this title; (2) any fee ... has been paid; (3) the plan has been proposed
in good faith and not ... forbidden by law; (4) the value ... of property to
be distributed under the plan ... [to] each allowed unsecured claim is not less
than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor
were liquidated under chapter 7 ... and (6) the debtor will be able to make
all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan.
Id. § 1325(a) (subsection (5) deals with secured claims).
123. Id. § 1325(b). Section 1325(b)(2) defines "disposable income" as "income which is
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss2/6
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stantial portion of his unsecured claims, in chapter 13. For example, the
debtor may have little disposable income to commit to the plan. If the
amount of disposable income is only sufficient to make payments equal
to the amount that would have been distributed under a chapter 7 liqui-
dation, the debtor can avoid unsecured debts to the same extent as under
chapter 7. Of course, the plan will have to be proposed in good faith and
successfully completed by the debtor. 124
The above example exposes the inconsistency of the Kelly and Davenport
decisions. Kelly held that criminal penalties are not dischargeable in chapter
7. The Court was guided by strong federalism concerns and the widely
accepted view that criminal penalties are unaffected by bankruptcy. 25 The
obvious question after Davenport is: Why do these principles forbidding
discharge apply when the criminal offender files under chapter 7, but do
not apply under chapter 13? The answer seems clear: The principles
underlying Kelly should apply regardless of whether the debtor files under
chapter 7 or chapter 13. In fact, the Davenport Court acknowledged this
concern, but held that enforcing the Code according to its terms requires
the contrary.
26
Despite this acknowledged inconsistency, the Court insisted that its
decision did not constitute a retreat from the principles applied in Kelly 27
At first reading, the Court's statement is difficult to understand because
Davenport seems completely oblivious to the concerns enunciated in Kelly.
However, the Court was simply pointing out that Congress' intent in
enacting chapter 13 cannot be ignored. The Court cited Kelly's finding
that the pre-Code practice represented an unwillingness by courts to in-
terpret bankruptcy laws as remitting state criminal judgments and con-
cluded that this was its basis for holding that section 523(a)(7) applies
broadly to all criminal penalties.1
2
Turning to chapter 13, the Davenport Court was faced with the unmis-
takable exclusion of section 523(a)(7)'s exception to discharge from the
chapter 13 discharge. 129 The Court held that Congress clearly intended to
received by the debtor and which is not reasonably necessary ... for the maintenance or
support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor" and "for the payment of expenditures
necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation of ... [the debtor's] business."
Id. § 1322(b)(2).
124. Remember, a chapter 13 plan only has to provide for payment to unsecured claims
of an amount not less than what would be paid under chapter 7. Id. § 1325(a)(4). Under
chapter 13, a debtor is discharged as soon as he completes the payments provided for by
the plan. Id. § 1328(a). Under chapter 7, the debtor is discharged immediately. Id. § 727.
125. See supra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
126. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. at 2133-34.
127. Id. at 2133.
128. Id. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 44 (1986).
129. Title 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) provides:
As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under
the plan ... the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided
for by the plan ... except any debt (1) provided for under section 1322(b)(5)
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limit the exceptions to discharge applicable in chapter 13, and that criminal
penalties are not excepted from the chapter 13 discharge. 30 The Court's
reasoning is tenable in light of Kelly and the broad scope of a chapter 13
discharge. Therefore, once it determined that criminal penalties are debts
under the Code, the Court's only logical course of action was to allow
the restitution obligations to be discharged under chapter 13.
The problem with Davenport is that congressional intent is not clear as
to whether criminal penalties, including restitution obligations, are debts.
In fact, the Kelly 'Court expressed "serious doubts" as to whether Congress
intended for criminal penalties to be considered debts.' Although Dav-
enport focuses on restitution obligations, its holding could extend to make
all types of crimi:aal penalties dischargeable under chapter 13. Of course,
to be dischargeable under any chapter, criminal penalties must constitute
debts under the Code.
The Kelly/Davenport Dilemma
The Supreme Court's approach to the question of whether criminal
restitution obligations should be dischargeable in bankruptcy obviously
raises some perplexing issues. In deciding whether criminal penalties are
debts, the Court was faced with the congressional intent that "claim'
3 2
be defined as broadly as possible so that all of the debtor's legal obligations
could be dealt with in bankruptcy, thereby permitting the broadest possible
relief. '
Based on this intent, the Court could not easily justify holding that
Congress had intended criminal restitution obligations not to be included
in the definition of "debt." In Kelly, the Court declined to decide the
question for that reason, but was not forced to allow the discharge of
restitution obligations because it was able to fit the obligations into the
exception to discharge contained in section 523(a)(7).13
4
However, by fitting criminal restitution obligations into 523(a)(7)'s ex-
ception to discharge, the Court trapped itself into holding that the obli-
gations were dischargeable under chapter 13. Applying Kelly, the Court
in Davenport war forced to allow the restitution obligations to be dis-
charged under chapter 13. The effect of the two cases is not limited to
restitution obligations. In Kelly, the Court held that section 523(a)(7)
applies to any condition imposed by a state court as part of a criminal
.. or (2) of tte kind specified in section 523(a)(5) of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1988).
130. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. at 2133.
131. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 50.
132. See supra note 73.
133. HousE REPORT, supra note 16, at 310, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADMIN.
NEws 5963, 6266; accord SENATE REPoRT, supra note 13, at 21-22, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CoNo. & ADmr. NEWS 5787, 5807-08.
134. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1988). See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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sentence.' 35 There is no basis for concluding that Davenport should be
limited to restitution obligations. Section 1328(a) unmistakably provides
that section 523(a)(7) does not apply to the normal chapter 13 discharge.
136
This reflects Congress' intent to give almost complete relief to a chapter
13 debtor who successfully completes payments under a plan. Of course,
the Court could not rewrite the statute to create a new exception to
discharge.
Through Kelly and Davenport, the Court has reached a dilemma: the
Court recognizes the strong, longstanding principles against federal intru-
sion on state criminal processes and therefore believes that criminal pen-
alties should be excepted from discharge. 37 However, finding criminal
penalties to be excepted from discharge allows such penalties to be dis-
charged under chapter 13. This dilemma could be avoided entirely by
approaching the problem from the perspective of the larger question of
defining the scope of the Code.
The Scope of the Bankruptcy Code - The Broader Question
Federalism and the Supremacy Clause
Before considering the question of whether criminal restitution obliga-
tions are debts, courts should address the broader question of whether the
Code applies to such obligations at all. The fundamental notion that the
bankruptcy laws should not interfere with state criminal proceedings forms
the central basis for the argument that such proceedings, and their resulting
penalties, do not fall within the scope of the Code. The right to devise
and enforce criminal sanctions is an important facet of the sovereignty
retained by the states.' The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized
"the fundamental policy against federal interference with state criminal
prosecutions." 139
Those concerns run counter to the disturbing proposition that a state
criminal judgment could be overturned, or at least ineffectuated, by op-
eration of the Code. Nonetheless, such preemption was recognized in
Davenport, where the Court acknowledged the ability of convicted crim-
inals to avoid restitution obligations imposed as part of a criminal sentence,
135. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 50.
136. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1988). This is only true in a normal chapter 13 discharge, or
in other words, a discharge obtained by completing payments under a chapter 13 plan. The
court can also grant the debtor a chapter 13 hardship discharge under § 1328(b). All of §
523(a)'s exceptions apply to a hardship discharge. Section 1328(b) provides that the court
may grant a discharge under chapter 13 even though a debtor has not fully completed
payments under the plan if: (1) the debtor's failure to complete the payments is due to
circumstances beyond his control; (2) the allowed unsecured claims have received as much
as they would have received if the case had been filed under chapter 7; and (3) modification
of the plan under § 1329 is not practicable. Id. § 1328(b).
137. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
138. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 47.
139. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), cited in Kelly, 479 U.S. at 47.
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under the protective umbrella of the Code. That is the disturbing aspect
of Davenport.
In Kelly, the Court expressed similar concerns, noting that its interpre-
tation of the Code must be guided by the deep conviction that federal
bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the decisions of state criminal
courts. 40 The Court also stated that one of the strongest considerations
which must influence its interpretation is the state interest of administering
the criminal justice system free from federal interference.' 4'
These federalism concerns are clearly important values implicitly pro-
vided by the Constitution and repeatedly recognized by the Supreme
Court. 142 However, federalism must give way to the Supremacy Clause,
which expressly mandates the preemption by federal laws of conflicting
state laws.143 Thus, federalism concerns must only be a consideration in
the preemption analysis. 144
Federal law may preempt state law in several different ways. First,
Congress is empowered to preempt state law by stating its intent to do so
in express terms.'4 Second, congressional intent to preempt may be inferred
from a scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it
with state laws on the same subject.146 While these grounds for preemption
clearly apply to prevent states from enacting their own bankruptcy laws,
they do not apply to the question of whether the operation of state criminal
laws is preempted by the Code.
However, preemption can also arise where Congress has not completely
displaced state regulation in a particular area if a state law conflicts with
federal law. 47 The state law will be preempted to the extent it actually
conflicts with the federal law. 148 Such a conflict arises if a state statute
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
140. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 47.
141. Id. at 49.
142. See id. at 47-49. See also Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-46; United States v. Ron Pair
Enter., 489 U.S. 235, 245 (1989).
143. The supremacy clause of the Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of tha United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby ....
U.S. CONST. art. VT, ci. 2.
144. Note, Criminal Restitution and Bankruptcy Code Discharge - Another Case for
Defining the Scope of Federal Bankruptcy Law, 65 NoTRE DAMS L. Ray. 107, 136 (1989)
[hereinafter Note, Criminal Restitution].
145. Pacific Gas & EIlec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,
280-81 (1987); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
146. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 204; Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
147. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 204.




purposes and objectives of Congress.1 49 Therefore, if the purposes and
objectives of the bankruptcy laws are not frustrated by the exclusion of
state criminal sentences, there should be no preemption. 50
The Code's objectives are to provide a fair and final distribution and
settlement of the debtor's assets among his creditors' and to provide
individual debtors with a financial "fresh start.' 51 s2 The former objective
was the original objective of bankruptcy laws, while the latter developed
as a result of the increase in consumer debt and the resulting increase in
consumer insolvency.
5 3
The fresh start principle as a primary purpose of bankruptcy was first
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt.14 The Court
stated that a primary purpose of the bankruptcy law is to "relieve the
honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness ... ."151 The
Court clearly stated that the fresh start concept was intended to apply to
"honest" debtors. Seemingly, such a policy was not intended to apply to
criminal offenders seeking to be freed from criminal obligations, through
bankruptcy.5 6 In this respect, the exclusion of criminal sentences from the
Code does not impede the fresh start objective.'
57
149. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also Guerra, 479 U.S. at 281;
Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, Inc. v. Agricultural Mktg. and Bargaining Bd., 467
U.S. 461, 478 (1984); Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 204; Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De
la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 156 (1982); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971).
150. In support of non-preemption is the Supreme Court policy that "pre-emption is not
to be lightly presumed." Guerra, 479 U.S. at 281 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S.
725, 746 (1981)).
151. See supra note 17.
152. See supra notes 15-16.
153. See HousE REPORT, supra note 16, at 3-5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNG. &
ADn~m. NEws 5963, 5965-66.
154. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
155. Id. at 244 (emphasis added). In Hunt, the Court stated:
One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to "relieve the honest
debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start
afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business
misfortunes" .. . This purpose of the act has been again and again emphasized
by the courts as being a public as well as private interest, in that it gives the
honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution any property
which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear
field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of
preexisting debt.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Williams v. United States Fidelity Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55
(1915)).
156. See Hamby v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 217 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1954) ("[I]t is
not the purpose of the bankruptcy laws to grant discharges to those who have dishonestly
appropriated them."); People v. Topping Bros., Inc., 79 Misc. 2d 260, 261, 359 N.Y.S.2d
985, 987 (Crim. Ct. 1974) ("T]he purpose of the bankruptcy laws is to assist individuals
from being completely overwhelmed by their debts and not to provide them with a means
to avoid criminal responsibility for their actions.").
157. See Note, The Second Circuit's Novel Approach to Defining Debt Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code: In re Robinson, 60 ST. Joint's L. REv. 344, 357 (1986) (argued that excluding
criminal restitution from discharge would not impinge on the "fresh start" policy stating:
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In addition, the idea that the Code is designed to govern disputes between
an insolvent debtor and his creditor is not offended by the exclusion of
state criminal penalties. This idea is a facet of the other primary objective
of the Code, the fair and equitable distribution of the debtor's assets to
his creditors. While a criminal restitution obligation may have an incidental
effect on creditors' claims (e.g., restitution obligations would reduce the
amount of future income available for incorporation into a chapter 13
plan), it would not prevent the fair and equitable distribution of the
debtor's remaining property among the creditors.
State criminal laws do not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in enacting
the Code and thus should not be preempted. 5 ' In addition, if the legislative
history of an enactment contains controlling statements to the effect that
Congress does not intend to preempt particular areas of state law, the
courts should honor the state laws.5 9 The legislative history of the Code
does contain a statement which can be read as showing an intent by
Congress not to preempt state criminal law.16 This often-cited statement
appears in the Senate Report: "The bankruptcy laws are not a haven for
criminal offenders, but are designed to give relief from financial overex-
tension."' 6' Also, the federalism concerns expressed in Kelly, and acknowl-
edged in Davenport, lend additional support for non-preemption. 62
By allowing the discharge of criminal restitution obligations, the Su-
preme Court, in effect, held that the Code preempts state criminal laws
to the extent such laws conflict with the Code's objectives. As shown
above, a preemption analysis suggests that the Code should not preempt,
and thus should riot affect, state criminal laws or the resulting criminal
penalties.
The Civil Law/Criminal Law Distinction
An examination of the nature of the bankruptcy laws also lends support
for the idea that state criminal laws are not within the scope of the Code.
There is support for the proposition that state criminal laws are simply
not within the scope of the Code, which is strictly civil in nature. 163
In Kelly, the Court referred to the "state of the law" prior to the
Code's enactment. The Court found the existence of a well-established
"The interests of the state, the bankruptcy system and the debtor can be served only if the
courts focus on giving the debtor owing criminal restitution a 'fresh start' and not a head
start.").
158. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973)
(legislative history indicated congressional intent not to preempt so state laws held not
preempted).
160. See 2 COLLIER, supra note 13, 362.05.
161. SENATE REPORT, supra note 13, at 51, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 5787, 5837.
162. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
163. This idea could also form the basis of an argument that federal criminal laws are




judicial exception to discharge for all criminal sentences, despite the lack
of such an exception in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.164 The Court cited
In re Moore'65 as the leading case on the subject. Moore stated that the
provisions of the bankruptcy act have reference alone to civil liabilities,
as demands between debtor and creditors, as such, and not to punishment
inflicted pro bono publico for crimes committed. 6  Moore stands not only
for the proposition that criminal penalties are not debts under the Code,
but for the broader idea that the bankruptcy laws are not applicable to
any aspect of criminal law.' 67
An examination of the Code itself reveals nothing to offend the notion
that the Code does not encompass criminal laws. No mention of criminal
laws or proceedings, other than sections 362(b)(1) and 503(b)(3)(C), appears
in the Code. 6s Section 503(b)(3)(C) allows a creditor to be paid, as an
administrative expense, any expense incurred in connection with the pros-
ecution of a criminal offense relating to the bankruptcy case. 69 The
provision does not attempt to affect the criminal prosecution, and does
not provide any grounds for concluding that criminal laws are within the
scope of the Code.
Section 362(a) automatically stays collection and enforcement proceed-
ings against the debtor and his property. 70 Section 362(b)(1) exempts from
the stay "the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or
proceeding against the debtor."' 17' This provision supports the proposition
that the Code does not apply to criminal sentences. In fact, as previously
noted, the Senate Report states that the purpose for the exception is that
the bankruptcy laws are not designed to protect criminal offenders from
punishment, but to offer relief from "financial overextension.' ' 72 Financial
overextension gives rise to civil, not criminal, liabilities.
73
164. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 44-47 (1986); see Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541,
30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1979).
165. 111 F. 145 (W.D. Ky. 1901).
166. See id. at 148-49.
167. See In re Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. 129, 133 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) ("Unlike an
obligation which arises out of a contractual, statutory or common law duty, here the
obligation is rooted in the traditional responsibility of a state to protect its citizens by
enforcing its criminal statutes and to rehabilitate an offender by imposing a criminal sanction
intended for that purpose."); In re Milone, 73 Bankr. 452, 455 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1987) (true
criminal proceeding is not affected by a bankruptcy proceeding involving the criminal
defendant).
168. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(1), 503(b)(3)(C) (1988). Section 523(a)(9) excepts certain debts
arising out of the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated. Id. §
523(a)(9). But, while of course, driving under the influence of alcohol is a criminal offense,
this exception applies to civil liabilities arising as a result of driving under the influence.
169. Id. § 503(b)(3)(C).
170. Id. § 362(a).
171. Id. § 362(b)(1).
172. SENATE REPORT, supra note 13, at 51, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 5787, 5837.
173. For example, financial overextension causes the debtor to default on loans and credit
agreements thereby giving the lenders, and/or creditors, an action to collect the debt. These
are civil actions between the debtor and his creditors bringing suit.
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In Davenport, the United States, appearing amicus curiae, contended
that section 362(b)(1) reflected Congress' intent to exempt restitution ob-
ligations from discharge under chapter 13. The Court addressed the ar-
gument in the context of the narrower question of whether restitution
obligations are dischargeable debts. Davenport disposed of the argument
by holding that sections 362(b)(1) and 523(a)(7) are not inconsistent.
7 4
The Court did not address the broader question of whether criminal
penalties are within the scope of the Code.
While sections 523(a)(7) and 726(a)(4) use the phrase "fine, penalty or
forfeiture," there is no indication that the phrase was meant to embrace
criminal sentences. 75 In Davenport, the United States argued that the
phrase should apply only to civil fines, penalties and forfeitures. The
Court rejected the argument, again relying on the holding in Kelly that
section 523(a)(7) applies to criminal restitution obligations. 176 Notwith-
standing Kelly, there is no direct statement by Congress that the phrase
is intended to apply to criminal fines, penalties and forfeitures.
Generally, the goal of civil law is to compensate for private wrongs.'"
Civil law governs disputes between individuals, and its purpose is to hold
individuals accountable to each other. 178 The bankruptcy laws are clearly
designed to govern such disputes. Bankruptcy law governs disputes between
a debtor and his creditors, not between the debtor and society. The
underlying dispute in a bankruptcy case lies between individuals and should
be governed by civil laws.
Criminal law, on the other hand, is concerned with public wrongs or
conflicts that arise between individual offenders and society. 79 It is based
upon societal expectations that establish the minimal behavioral standards
of civilized society.8 0 Criminal law is aimed at preventing injury to the
health, safety, morals and welfare of the public.'8  This protection of
society is accomplished by punishing those who have done public harm
and by threatening those who have not yet done harm to others.8 2
Criminal restitution obligations result from the resolution of a conflict
between society and a criminal offender. The offender has acted in a
manner which goes beyond the minimum standards of behavior demanded
by society. The only way to maintain these standards of behavior is to
penalize those who do not conform.' Accordingly, the criminal law is
designed to meet this end.
174. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
175. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(7), 726(a)(4) (1988).
176. Pennsylvania Welfare Dep't v. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. 2126, 2132 (1990).
177. See Faircloth v. Beard, 320 N.C. 505, 507, 358 S.E.2d 512, 514 (1987).
178. See 5 W. BLAcxSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5. See also Commonwealth v. Shimpeno, 50
A.2d 39, 44 (Pa. 1946).
179. See 5 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5. See also Burks v. State, 795 S.W.2d 913,
915 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
180. R. POUND, CRI1MINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 4 (1924).
181. LAFAVE & Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 10 (2d ed. 1986).
182. Id. See generallj Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts, 43 COLUM. L. REv.
753 (1943).




The bankruptcy laws were simply not designed with these penal concerns
in mind. The purpose of bankruptcy is to govern disputes between an
insolvent debtor and his creditors. The distinction between civil and crim-
inal laws is clear with respect to the bankruptcy laws.
The Code's purposes and goals8 4 reveal its civil character, and as such
it should not apply to criminal penalties. In re Moore8" limited the scope
of the Bankruptcy Act to civil liabilities. Moore should be recognized
under the Code as well because the bankruptcy laws are civil laws. 86
Solving the Kelly/Davenport Dilemma
Although the Supreme Court has spoken on the issue of whether criminal
restitution obligations are dischargeable in bankruptcy, the court left the
issue far from settled. The issue could have been settled judicially if the
Court would have addressed it in the context of the larger question, the
scope of the Code. The conflicts caused by Congress' intent to define debt
as broadly as possible, and to make chapter 13 relief as complete as
possible, would be eliminated if the Court held that criminal penalties are
not within the scope of the Code.
Such a holding could be accomplished by applying a preemption analysis
to the Code. As discussed above, there is a basis for holding that the
Code does not preempt state criminal laws to any extent. Obviously, the
Code does not wholly preempt the criminal law. However, under Daven-
port, state criminal laws are preempted to a certain extent. More specifi-
cally, Davenport contemplates that when a state-imposed criminal restitution
obligation conflicts with provisions of the Code, namely chapter 13, the
penalty is preempted. 187 A preemption analysis suggests that the Code
should not be held to preempt state criminal laws.' In addition, the civil
nature of the bankruptcy laws calls for holding criminal penalties outside
the scope of the Code.8 9
Once it is determined that the Code does not affect criminal restitution
obligations, then under chapter 7 the obligation remains after discharge.
The obligation will also remain after a chapter 13 discharge, unless satisfied
before the plan is completed. In addition, the obligation will have to be
included in the computation of the amount of the debtor's disposable
income available to pay debts under a chapter 13 plan. 90
States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948) (Congress prohibited concealing aliens. The Court held
that the penalty prescribed was too vague so one who did the forbidden act committed no
crime.).
184. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
185. 111 F. 145, 149-50 (W.D. Ky. 1901).
186. Id. at 149-50. See also supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
187. Although preemption is not specifically discussed by the Court, it is essentially the
result of its decision to allow the discharge of criminal restitution obligations in chapter 13.
Davenport hold that such obligations were dischargeable debts under chapter 13. Davenport,
110 S. Ct. at 2030-31.
188. See supra notes 145-61 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 163-86 and accompanying text.
190. See In re Cancel, 82 Bankr. 674, 677 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd on other
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Of course, Congress could always solve the Kelly/Davenport dilemma
by simply amending the Code in an appropriate manner. The Davenport
case, without a doubt, raised some legislative eyebrows. In fact, two bills
were introduced in the House of Representatives during the week following
the Davenport decision, and both were aimed specifically at eradicating
its result. 91 In addition, the problem has been raised in other proposed
legislation. 92 As a result of this strong dissent to the Davenport decision,
grounds, 85 Bankr. 677 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Clearly, a criminal restitution payment which is
ordered as a condition of probation would constitute a necessary expense that would be
first subtracted in determining the debtor's disposable income available to pay debts under
the [chapter 13] plan.").
191. H.R. 4959, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. 4981, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
In speaking of Davenport, the representative introducing bill 4959 to the House stated:
"What an awful result which we intend to cure by introduction of this legislation." 136
CONG. REc. H3098 (daily ed. June 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Gekas). For bill 4981, even
stronger language was used on the House floor, where it was stated: "In the Davenport
ruling, the Court determined that such obligations are dischargeable by convicted criminals
filing under chapter 13. Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing legislation to close this
loophole. Let us restore integrity to the bankruptcy code and to State criminal proceedings."
136 CONG. REc. H3266 (daily ed. June 6, 1990) (statement of Rep. Rowland).
House Bill 4959 (H.D. 4959) proposed that an eleventh exception to discharge be created:
§ 523(a)(11). This section would not have allowed a debtor to be discharged from a debt
"for a restitution payment under section 3663 or 3664 of title 18, or a similar State statute."
H.R. 4959, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). The bill also proposed to amend section 1328(a)(2)
by adding "or (a)(11)" after "section 523(a)(5)," which would have made the new exception
to discharge applicable in chapter 13, along with section 523(a)(5). Id.
House Bill 4981 (H.B 4981) also proposed to make restitution obligations nondischargeable
under chapter 13, but took a different approach. This bill proposed the "Bankruptcy
Antifraud Act of 1990." The act would have also added an eleventh exception to § 523(a),
making nondischargeable any debt arising "from a proceeding brought by a governmental
unit to recover civil or criminal restitution . . . ." H.R. 4981, 101st Cong., 2d Sess (1990).
In addition, H.B. 4981 proposed that section 1322(a), which sets forth the requirements of
a chapter 13 plan, be amended by adding a requirement that the plan "provide for the full
payment, in deferred cash payments, of all claims for debts of the kinds specified in section
523(a)(11)." Id. By adding a new § 523(a)(I1), as both bills would have done, uncertainty
for other criminal penalties could have been compounded by conceivable interpretations of
the section. The propos.-d section could have been read as showing congressional intent that
§ 523(a)(7) does not apply to criminal penalties, since criminal restitution would be specif-
ically provided for by the new § 523(a)(11). Remember Davenport's refusal to interpret a
statutory provision in a way that would render another provision superfluous. See supra
notes 97-98. If all criminal penalties were intended by Congress to be excepted from discharge
in § 523(a)(7), then there would be no reason to specifically except criminal restitution in a
separate provision. Under such an interpretation, other criminal penalties, other than res-
titution could be discharged under chapter 7. Such a result was clearly not the intention of
the bills.
192. H.R. 4534, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Bill 4534]; S. 2021, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1990) (a bill to ensure that the bankruptcy laws are not used to prevent restitution
to, or recovery of, failed financial institutions; the bill would create a narrow exception to
chapter 13 discharge for persons who criminally defraud failed financial institutions); H.R.
3690, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (a bill to amend chapter 13 to prevent the discharge of
certain fines, penalties, and forfeitures); H.R. 3691, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (a bill to




Congress recently amended the Code to make restitution obligations non-
dischargeable under chapter 13.193
The amendment adds the following language to section 1328(a) which
excepts certain debts from the chapter 13 discharge: "(3) for restitution
included in a sentence on the debtor's conviction of a crime.'' 194 Therefore,
criminal restitution obligations are no longer dischargeable under chapter
13.
In Davenport, the Court held that restitution obligations in a criminal
case do constitute debts within the meaning of the Code and are therefore
dischargeable under chapter 13.191 While overruling Davenport's result by
excepting criminal restitution obligations from discharge under chapter 13,
Congress has endorsed its analysis. Specifically, Congress has implicitly
accepted Davenport's holding that criminal restitution obligations, and
thus criminal penalties in general, are debts.
Congress has attacked the issue, as done by the Supreme Court, in the
context of the smaller question. The amendment does not affect the
dischargeability of other types of criminal penalties giving rise to monetary
obligations, thus leaving uncertain their dischargeability under chapter 13.
payable in a criminal case). House Bill 4534 was aimed at ensuring "that the bankruptcy
laws are not used to prevent restitution to, or recovery of failed financial institutions." Bill
4534, supra. The title of the proposed act was the "Savings and Loan Recovery Act of
1990." Id. The bill would have made significant changes to §§ 522, 523 and 1328. Among
other things, the proposed act would have amended § 523(a) so it would read: "(a) A
discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), 1328(a), or 1328(b) of this title does
not discharge an individual debtor from any debt" included in the § 523(a) exceptions. Id.
The change is that the § 1328(a) discharge would be subject to the § 523(a) exceptions. In
addition, the bill proposes to amend section 1328(a) to make applicable all of the § 523(a)
exceptions to the § 1328(a) discharge. Id.
If this bill would have been enacted it would have solved the Kelly/Davenport dilemma
and then some. The act would in effect have made the chapter 13 discharge no more
advantageous than the chapter 7 discharge and thus, under Kelly's ruling that § 523(a)(7)
applies to criminal penalties obligations arising therefrom would be nondischargeable under
chapter 13. While the proposed act was a comprehensive scheme aimed at curbing abuses
of the bankruptcy laws in the troubled Savings and Loan industry, the drawback is that the
sound policy behind the broader § 1328 discharge would be abandoned. That policy is that
the debtor who makes an effort to complete a plan under chapter 13, as opposed to a
chapter 7 liquidation, possibly resulting in more money for his creditors should be rewarded
with a broader discharge.
193. Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, § 3, 104 Stat. 2865.
The Act also amends section 523(a)(9) to make nondischargeable any debt "for death or
personal injury" caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and
amends § 1328(a)(2) to make that exception to discharge applicable to chapter 13. Id.
194. Id. Title 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) provides in relevant part:
As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under
the plan .... the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided
for by the plan ... except any debt - (1) provided for under section 1322(b)(5)
of this title; or (2) of the kind specified in section 523(a)(5) of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1988).
195. Pennsylvania Welfare Dep't v. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. 2126, 2134 (1990).
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Although Congress' action narrowly solves the Kelly/Davenport dilemma
with respect to criminal restitution obligations, it provides no guidance
for future determinations of whether criminal laws are affected by the
Code. The guidance offered by the amendment is that criminal laws are
within the scope of the Code and that criminal penalties constitute debts.
Instead of carefully excepting criminal restitution from discharge, Con-
gress, like the courts, should approach the issue in the context of the
broader question. In other words, Congress should enact legislation defin-
ing the scope of the Code and excluding state criminal laws from the
operation of the Code.
All that is needed is a clear statement by Congress of its intent not to
preempt state criminal laws. 9 6 If Congress expressly states that it does not
intend to preempt state criminal laws, the courts must honor the state
laws. 197 One way to do this would be to enact a provision defining the
scope of the Code. A new section could be enacted as follows:
§ 100. Scope of title.
This title shall establish the uniform law of bankruptcies in the
United States. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to
displace any slate criminal law or to affect any penalty resulting
from the enforcement of such law.
Such a section would clearly solve the Kelly/Davenport dilemma and would
accord with the views that the Code is a civil statute and that state criminal
laws should not be preempted by the Code. 19
The provision could also be used to expressly exclude specific federal
criminal sanctions from the operation of the Code. 99 Other conflicts
between state and federal law could be resolved in the scope section, either
originally enacted as part of the new section or added by amendment. 210
196. See supra note 146.
197. See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
198. Another approach that has been suggested is an amendment to the definition of
claim in 11 U.S.C. ji 131(4)(a) (1988) which would exclude any obligation of the debtor
arising out of a criminal proceeding against the debtor. Note, Criminal Restitution, supra
note 144, at 138.
199. The question of whether federal criminal laws are within the scope of the Code raises
some difficulties, becamue neither the supremacy clause nor federalism concerns are appli-
cable. Therefore, the question of whether federal criminal laws are within the scope of the
Code would be a policy determination by Congress. Congress would thus be able to decide
whether a federal criminal sanction should be dischargeable in bankruptcy on a statute by
statute basis, and make amendments to the proposed scope provision accordingly.
200. The following are some of the areas of state law that have conflicted with the Code:
environmental laws (Fee, e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) (Court held that a
cleanup order obtained in a state court which had been converted into a money judgment
was dischargeable in bankruptcy)), family law (see, e.g., In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024 (5th
Cir. 1975)) (amount awarded to bankrupt's ex-wife during divorce proceedings as advance
to community from her ,.eparate estate was nondischargeable debt)), and insurance law (see,
e.g., A.H. Robbins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.) (debtor's liability insurance




A scope provision would provide guidance for courts and promote a more
consistent interpretation of the Code and its various provisions.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decisions in Kelly v. Robinson20 1 and Pennsylvania
Welfare Department v. Davenport20 2 are manifestations of the problems
which arise because of the inherent conflict between the Bankruptcy Code
and state criminal laws. Applying the Code to criminal restitution obli-
gations creates inconsistent results. The inconsistency is evidenced by the
fact that as a result of Kelly and Davenport, a convicted criminal could
discharge a criminal restitution obligation under chapter 13 to the same
extent as if he were allowed a discharge for such obligation under chapter
7. 203 The criminal must simply file under chapter 13 instead of chapter 7.
Thus, under Davenport the principles underlying the decision to make
criminal restitution obligations, or penalties in general, nondischargeable
under chapter 7 are wholly inapplicable in a chapter 13 case.
Although Congress intended a broader discharge under chapter 13 for
the debtor who earned it by completing a rehabilitative plan, that intention
should not be construed as displacing the basic rule that the bankruptcy
courts should not invalidate state criminal judgments. 204 More fundamen-
tally, a convicted criminal should not be able to avoid part of a criminal
sentence by filing for bankruptcy. 20 5 The proposition offends society's
expectation that a criminal will be held accountable for criminal activities.
For these reasons, Congress amended the Code to eradicate the result
of Davenport.206 Through this amendment, proponents of the view that
the bankruptcy laws should not affect criminal laws may have won the
battle but lost the war. By-specifically excluding criminal restitution ob-
ligations from discharge, Congress has endorsed the view that criminal
201. 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
202. 110 S. Ct. 2126 (1990).
203. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
204. The Kelly Court stated: "Our interpretation of the Code also must reflect the basis
for this judicial exception, a deep conviction that federal bankruptcy courts should not
invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47
(1986).
205. See In re Abramson, 210 F. 878, 880 (2d Cir. 1914) ("[B]ankrupts who have violated
laws passed for the public good cannot escape punishment by going into bankruptcy."); In
re Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. 129, 134 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) ("It would defy both logic and
reason to allow a convicted person, who has been ordered to make restitution to his victim
in lieu of incarceration, to use the Bankruptcy Code to escape the consequences of his
crime."); In re Zarzynski, 771 F.2d 304, 305 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[I]t is not within the intent
of Bankruptcy law ... to relieve a creditor from criminal responsibility."). See also cases
cited supra note 156; Note, Criminal Restitution, supra note 144 (called for recognition of
"complete separation" doctrine which would exclude bankruptcy law from interfering with
state criminal law).
206. Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, § 3, 104 Stat. 2865.
See discussion supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
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penalties are debts under the Code. As a result, other types of criminal
penalties not specifically accounted for will be dischargeable under a
reasonable interpretation of the Code. In addition, the amendment leaves
the resolution of any conflict between the Code and state criminal laws
unclear.
If the courts, or better yet, Congress, would define the scope of the
Code in a manner that excludes state criminal laws, the fundamental policy
against federal interference with state criminal prosecutions would 'be
served. 207 Such a definition would not prevent the effective operation of
the Code in meeting its underlying objectives of giving the debtor a fresh
start and distributing the debtor's property fairly among the various
creditors.2 8 More importantly, such a definition would prevent the use of
the Bankruptcy Code as an escape route for convicted criminals.
Robert Finley Dougherty
207. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971); Kelly, 479 U.S. at 47.
208. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
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